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Abstract
Consider a database that contains thousands of entries of the iris biometric. Each entry identifies an
individual, so it is especially important that it remains secure. However, searching for entries among
an encrypted database proves to be a security problem - how should one search encrypted data without leaking any information to a potential attacker? The proximity searchable encryption scheme, as
discussed in the work by Cachet et al., uses the notions of inner product encryption developed by Kim
et al.. In this paper, we will focus on the efficiency of these schemes. Specifically, how the symmetry of
the bilinear pairing group effects the time required to execute a search.
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Introduction

Consider a database of sensitive data. It is easy to see why encrypting this data is important - the owner
of the data would not want an attacker to be able to steal it. But encrypting the database creates another
issue: how to search for a specific entry. Consider a query, q. The easiest, but likely least efficient, way
to search for an entry would be to decrypt everything, and compare all with q until a match is found.
However, for a database with thousands of entries, it is easy to see why this might not be the best method
of searching. The goal is to be able to efficiently search the database while the entries remain encrypted.
That being said, searching encrypted entries implies there needs to be some way of grouping those that are
similar and thus, may match the query q. This opens up the possibility for leakage - i.e. based on q, there
is leakage if an attacker can learn any information at all about related entries [WLD+ 17, IKK12, GLMP18,
CGPR15]. This may be the entries themselves, or even just components of them that are similar. While it
ultimately depends on the user’s definition of security, our goal is to minimize leakage.
There are multiple possible solutions for this problem of searchable encryption [FVY+ 17, CGKO11], but the
solution we will be discussing is based off the work done by Kim et al [KLM+ 18]. on function hiding inner
product encryption and Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22] on its application to proximity searchable encryption. In
order to understand this work, one must first understand inner product encryption. In an inner product
encryption scheme, the secret key and ciphertext are given in the form of vectors ⃗x and ⃗y , respectively.
Instead of decrypting normally, the decrypt function in this scheme returns the inner product of these two
vectors [OT12, KT14, KLM+ 18, BJK15].
We will be discussing these schemes in the context of a biometric database. Biometric data, since it relates
to attributes of individuals, is especially sensitive [DRD+ 20]. Biometrics, such as fingerprints, facial, vocal,
iris, or vein patterns, are used to identify certain individuals [Dau14] [Fou]. These identifiers are unlikely
to change drastically as time goes on, and can be compromised easily [AF19].
As is done in Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22], we will be focusing on the iris biometric. Similar to all biometrics,
iris data is especially noisy [SSF19, Dau09, HBF10]. This means that two scans of the same iris may product
similar, but slightly different results [ACD+ 22]. Therefore, when searching for specific iris data points,
it is important to be able to perform a proximity search. Given a query q, the search algorithm should
return all entries within a certain distance from the query [ACD+ 22]. The proximity search algorithm
as described in Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22] uses the function hiding inner product encryption scheme as described in Kim et al. [KLM+ 18] to locate encrypted entries in an iris biometric database. Given a query q,
the algorithm calculates the inner product between q and the stored records, and returns the records with
the appropriate inner product.
In this paper, we will mainly focus on the efficiency of the proximity search and inner product encryption
algorithms. It was discovered that the efficiency of the search algorithm relates directly to the efficiency
of the decryption algorithm. That being said, the speed of the decryption algorithm is dependent on the
type of elliptic curve that is used for the group pairing operations. In the scheme defined by Kim et al.
[KLM+ 18], the MNT159 curve, a 159-bit asymmetric pairing curve [AGM+ 13], is used. By switching to
SS512, a 512-bit symmetric pairing curve [AGM+ 13], the efficiency of the search algorithm improved by a
factor of 4. While the security of these algorithms has been proved for an asymmetric pairing [ACD+ 22,
KLM+ 18], the proof must be extended to include new cases in which objects from the same group can be
paired. This paper will set up and show that the new cases do not impact the security of the schemes.
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1.1

Contributions

This paper expands on the work done by Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22]. The results of this thesis are integrated
into the latest online version [CAD+ 20]. The Multi Random Projection IPE scheme uses an asymmetric
pairing group as described in Kim et al. [KLM+ 18]. However, this paper proves that the use of a symmetric pairing group is 4 times more efficient, while still maintaining the security of the scheme. The body of
this thesis is organized around showing these two points with Section 4 establishing security of the scheme
with symmetric pairings and Section 5 showing performance of the revised scheme.
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Preliminaries

This section discusses various preliminary topics required for the understanding of the rest of this paper.

2.1

Bilinear Mapping Groups [Wei40, Jou04, BF01]

A bilinear mapping describes a function that maps elements from a set of 2 groups to a 3rd group. These
mappings are often described as pairing functions because they pair two elements into a target group.
Consider a set of 3 groups, G1 , G2 , GT , with a deterministic map e defined as follows:
e : G1 × G2 → GT
Let g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 be generators for their respective groups. The 3 groups have a prime order of q.
Let a, b ∈ Zq .
e(g1a , g2b ) = e(g1 , g2 )ab ∈ GT
e(g1 , g2 ) ̸= 1
If G1 ̸= G2 , we say this is an asymmetric pairing. Likewise, if G1 = G2 , it is symmetric.
Definition 1 ( [ACD+ 22] Asymmetric Bilinear Group). Suppose G1 , G2 , and GT are three groups (respectively) of prime order q with generators g1 ∈ G1 , g2 ∈ G2 and gT ∈ GT respectively. We denote
a value x encoded in G1 with either g1x or [x]1 , we denote values encoded in G2 and GT similarly. Let
e : G1 × G2 → GT be a non-degenerate (i.e. e(g1 , g2 ) ̸= 1) bilinear pairing operation such that for all
x, y ∈ Zq , e([x]1 , [y]2 ) = e(g1 , g2 )xy . We assume the group operations in G1 , G2 and GT and the pairing
operation e are efficiently computable, then (G1 , G2 , GT , q, e) defines an asymmetric bilinear group.
Definition 2 (Symmetric Bilinear Group). Suppose G1 and GT are two groups (respectively) of prime
order q with generators g1 ∈ G1 and gT ∈ GT respectively. We denote a value x encoded in G1 with
either g1x or [x]1 , we denote values encoded in GT similarly. Let e : G1 × G1 → GT be a non-degenerate
(i.e. e(g1 , g1 ) ̸= 1) bilinear pairing operation such that for all x, y ∈ Zq , e([x]1 , [y]1 ) = e(g1 , g1 )xy . We
assume the group operations in G1 and GT and the pairing operation e are efficiently computable, then
(G1 , GT , q, e) defines an symmetric bilinear group.

2.2

Generic Group Model [Sho97]

The Generic Group Model is a cryptographic model in which an attacker is able to view handles of group
elements, instead of the group elements themselves. A handle is a random string determined by a truly
random function, σ. For example, for each g1 , g2 , g3 ∈ G for a group G, the attacker can only see σ(g1 ), σ(g2 ), σ(g3 ).
Additionally the attacker has access to a group oracle. Given the handles σ(g1 ) and σ(g2 ), they are allowed to query the oracle for σ(g1 + g2 ).
The Generic Group Model is often used for assessing the hardness of various assumptions and protocols. That being said, we will now walk through a proof as an example of how certain assumptions are
proved to be secure in the Generic Group Model. We will use the following description of Decisional DiffieHellman.
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2.2.1

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) [KL14]

Consider a cyclic group G with order n and generator g ∈ G. Let x, y ∈ Zn be independently chosen
values, and consider g x and g y .
Computational hardness in DDH states that an attacker cannot distinguish (g x , g y , g xy ) from (g x , g y , g z )
for independently chosen z ∈ Zn . In other words, g xy appears to be a uniformly random element in G.
Theorem 1. Decisional Diffie-Hellman is secure in the Generic Group Model.
Proof. Let G be a cyclic group with prime order q and generator g ∈ G. Let x, y, z ∈ Zq be independently
chosen values.
Consider an efficient attacker. The attacker receives σ(e), σ(g), σ(g a ), σ(g b ), σ(g ab ), σ(g z ) and constructs
a table of known handles. The attacker can only ask the oracle for handles of elements they have already
been given. Note however, that the attacker can query the oracle for σ(g a+b ) and other linear combinations of g a and g b . If these resulting handles are not already in their known table, they get added. Additionally, the attacker may test the string equality of different handles - i.e. if σ(g a ) = σ(g b ).
The scheme is considered secure if the attacker cannot distinguish between σ(g ab ) and σ(g z ). We must
prove each of the following requirements for security:
1. The distributions of σ(g ab ) and σ(g z ) must be identical.
2. The range of σ must be significantly larger than the domain.
3. The attacker cannot calculate σ(g ab ) by adding σ(g a ) b-times (or vice-versa).
Claim 1. The distributions of σ(g ab ) and σ(g z ) are identical.
We know that a, b, z are selected uniformly at random from Zq . Therefore, a, b, ab and z have the same
distributions. This implies g ab and g z will also have the same distributions.
Claim 2. The range of σ is significantly larger than the domain.
The domain of σ is simply the order of |G| = q. Although q is a significantly large prime, the range of σ is
approximated to be q 3 . Therefore we can say there is a high probability of no repeated handles.
Claim 3. The probability that the attacker calculates σ(g ab ) by adding σ(g a ) b-times (or vice versa) is
negligible.
Given σ(g a ) and σ(g b ), we say the probability of guessing a or b from these handles is at most 2q .
∀a ̸= 0, Pr[A = a|σ(g a ), σ(g b )] =

1
q−1

The attacker must be able to guess a or b in order to compute σ(g ab ) and be able to distinguish from
σ(g z ). For each query, the probability of the attacker accidentally guessing σ(g a ), σ(g b ) or σ(g ab ) increases
by at most 3q . Therefore, for n queries, the probability the attacker will guess one of the handles necessary
for distinguishing is 2+3n
q . If n = poly(λ) and q = ω(poly(λ)), then this probability is negligible.

2.3

Function Hiding Inner Product Encryption (FHIPE) [KLM+ 18, Lew16]

We now discuss the Function Hiding Inner Product Encryption scheme as it is described in Kim et al..
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The Setup function takes in 2 important parameters; the dimension (n), and the group (group name). Unless otherwise specified, group name is set to MNT159. This denotes an asymmetric elliptic curve with
a 159-bit base field. This function initializes the pairing groups G1 and G2 , and two random generators
g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 . Matrix B is also initialized from the group GLn (Zq ), along with its determinant
det(B), and B ∗ . Note that B ∗ = det(B)(B −1 )T . B is a matrix with size n × n and entries from the group
Zq . Setup returns the master secret key, msk , and public parameters, pp, which is empty by default. The
master secret key is equal to the following:
msk = (det(B), B, B ∗ , G, g1 , g2 )
The TokGen function takes in 2 parameters, msk and x̂, a vector of length n from the group Znq . Random
variable α is initialized from Zq . This function returns the key in the form (k1 , k2 ). This key is equal to
the following:
αdet(B) αx̂B
skx = (k1 , k2 ) = (g1
, g1 )
The Encrypt function takes in a similar 2 parameters as TokGen, msk and ŷ, a vector of length n from the
group Znq . Random variable β is initialized group Zq . This function returns the ciphertext in the form
(c1 , c2 ). The ciphertext is equal to the following:
∗

cty = (c1 , c2 ) = (g2β , g2β x̂B )
The Decrypt function takes in 4 parameters: pp, the public parameters, skx , the secret key, cty , the ciphertext, and a value for the max inner product. The output of this function is ⟨x, y⟩ as long as it is between
0 and the max inner product. This function computes t1 and t2 , then uses the Baby-step/Giant-step algo⟨x,y⟩
rithm [KM17] to solve for ⟨x, y⟩ where t2
= t1 .
∗

t1 = ⟨g2βxB , g1αxB ⟩
t2 = (g2 , g1 )αβBB

2.4

∗

Multi-random Projection IPE [ACD+ 22]

This implementation of the inner product encryption scheme uses the same structure and makes references
to the FHIPE code [KLM+ 18, Lew16]; however, improves performance by partitioning the matrices and
vectors into bases. This saves storage space and computation time.
Performance analysis was done on the code written by Cachet et al. [ACD+ 21] in order to speed up the
execution of the proximity search function. Although the main purpose is to search for nearby queries of
certain data, this code calls FHIPE scheme. In order to make Search faster, the following functions must
also be made faster: TokGen, Encrypt, Decrypt.
Ultimately, it was found that calling versions of the TokGen and Encrypt functions that leave out the calls
to the pairing group, makes a huge difference. This led to the discovery of utilizing a different type of pairing curve. Originally, the curve MNT159 was being used [Lew16]. By switching to SS512, results improved
significantly.

3

Definitions

This section provides various definitions that we will need for the main results that have not previously
been given.
Definition 3 ( [ACD+ 22] Secret key predicate encryption). Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter, M
be the set of attributes and F be a set of predicates. We define PE = (PE.Setup, PE.Encrypt, PE.TokGen,
PE.Decrypt), a secret-key predicate encryption scheme, as follows: PE.Setup(1λ ) → (sk, pp), PE.Encrypt(sk, x) →
ctx , PE.TokGen(sk, f ) → tkf , and PE.Decrypt(pp, tkf , ctx ) → b.
We require the scheme to have the following properties:
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1. Challenger draws b ←$ {0, 1}
2. Challenger computes (sk, pp) ← PE.Setup(1λ ) and sends pp to A and A′ .
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ s A chooses Xi ∈ X.
4. For 1 ≤ j ≤ r A chooses Yj ∈ Y .
5. Define S = X1 , ..., Xs and R = Y1 , .., Yr .
6. A sends S,R to PE.enc. Let xi ← Xi and yj ← Yj respectively.
7. Let z ← A({PE.enc(xi )}ri=1 , {PE.TokGen(yi )}sj=1 )
?

8. Let z ′ ← A′ {⟨xi , yj ⟩ = 0}r,s
i=1,j=1
9. A outputs some value denoted as z.
10. The advantage of A is
Pr[z = f (X, Y )] − Pr[z ′ = f (X, Y )].
Figure 1: Semantic Security Definition of Function-Hiding, Predicate Inner Product Encryption
Correctness:

For any x ∈ M, f ∈ F,

Pr f (x) = b



ctx ←PE.Encrypt(sk,x)
tkf ←PE.TokGen(sk,f )
b←PE.Decrypt(pp,tkf ,ctx )

≥ 1 − (λ).

Security of admissible queries: Let r = poly(λ) and s = poly(λ). Any PPT adversary A has only
(λ) advantage in the PE
IN D game defined in Figure 1. Token and encryption queries must meet the following
admissibility requirements, ∀j ∈ [1, r], ∀i ∈ [1, s],
(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

PE.Decrypt(pp, tkj , cti ) = PE.Decrypt(pp, tkj , cti ).

Remark: When we discuss performance numbers for searchable encryption, algorithms have different
names. For searchable encryption we consider four different algorithms BuildIndex, Setup, Trapdoor, Search
which correspond to Setup, Encrypt, TokGen, Decrypt respectively.

4

Main Result

In this section we show that the construction of Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22] is secure when using symmetric
bilinear groups. We present their scheme adapted to use symmetric bilinear groups in Figure 2. The result
is the symmetric bilinear group analogue of [ACD+ 22, Theorem 1].
Theorem 2. In the Generic Group Model for symmetric bilinear groups the construction in Figure 2 is a
secure IPEfh,sk,pred scheme according to Definition 3 for the family of predicates F = {fy |y ∈ Znq } such that
?

for all vectors x ∈ Znq , fy (x) = (⟨x, y⟩ = 0).
Proof. In this proof we do not provide a full overview of the simulator’s behavior which remains unchanged in our setting. We must argue however, that the simulator continues to be correct with the additional flexibility provided to the adversary by the ability to pair multiple elements in G. Concretely, this
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Setup(1λ , n, σ):

Encrypt(pp, sk, x):

1. Sample (G1 , GT , q, e) ← Gabg and randomly
sample generators g1 ∈ G1 .

$

1. Samples β ←
− Zq .

2. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ σ, randomly samples an invertible
×N
square matrix Bℓ ∈ ZN
and sets B∗ℓ = (B-ℓ1 )T ,
q
with N = ⌈n/σ⌉ + 1.

2. Splits x into σ subvectors xℓ of size
⌈n/σ⌉, and pads with zeroes if needed.

3. Outputs pp = (G1 , GT , q, e, n, σ) as public parameters and sk = (g1 , {Bℓ , B∗ℓ }σℓ=1 ).

− Zq then
3. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ σ − 1, samples ζℓ ←
Pσ−1
sets ζσ = − ℓ=1 ζℓ .

$

4. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ σ defines x′ℓ = ζℓ || xℓ and
sets ctℓ = [ β · (x′ℓ )T · B∗ℓ ]2 , a vector in G1 .

TokGen(pp, sk, y):
$

1. Sample α ←
− Zq .

5. Outputs ct = (ct1 , · · · , ctσ ).

2. Splits y into σ subvectors yℓ of size ⌈n/σ⌉ and
pads with zeroes if needed.
yℓ′

3. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ σ, defines
tkℓ = [ α ·

(yℓ′ )T

Decrypt(pp, tk, ct):


Computes Πσℓ=1 ΠN
i=1 e(tkℓ [i], ctℓ [i]) and returns ⊤ if the results is equal to 1 ∈ GT , ⊥
otherwise.

= 1 || yℓ and sets

· Bℓ ]1 , a vector in G1 .

4. Outputs tk = (tk1 , · · · , tkσ ).

Figure 2: Construction of MRProjSym. The only difference between this and MRProj [ACD+ 22] is that
MRProjSym construction uses a symmetric bilinear group while MRProj uses an assymetric bilinear group.
means that the adversary has the ability to ask to pair elements of tk with other elements of tk and elements of ct with elements of ct which was not possible before. In the asymmetric group setting, the adversary was limiting to pairing elements in ct with elements in tk. We refer the reader to [ACD+ 22, Equation
3] which shows how the simulator splits each query into two parts pi,j which consists of valid decryptions
(scaled by some values) and fi,j which consist of some other elements. As a quick review of notation:
• Let Q be the maximum number of queries made by an adversary.
• Let σ and N be as in Figure 2.
• For all i ∈ [Q], ℓ ∈ [σ] and k ∈ [N ],
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

– Let α̂(i) , β̂ (i) , x̂ℓ,k , ŷℓ,k represent the hidden variables α(i) , β (i) , xℓ,k , yℓ,k ,
– Let b̂ℓ,k,m and b̂∗ℓ,k,m represent the entry in position (k, m) of the Bℓ and B∗ℓ matrices respectively,
(i)

(i)

– Let ζ̂ℓ be the formal variables for ζℓ where the simulator tracks the constraints that for each
Pσ
(i)
(i)
(i)
i ∈ [Q], ℓ=1 ζ̂ℓ = 0 and let ŝℓ,m and t̂ℓ,m represent formal polynomials:
(i)

ŝℓ,m =

N
X

′(i)

ŷℓ,k · b̂ℓ,k,m = b̂ℓ,1,m +

k=1
(i)

t̂ℓ,m =

N
X

N
X

(i)

ŷℓ,k-1 · b̂ℓ,k,m

(1)

k=2
′(i)

(i)

x̂ℓ,k · b̂∗ℓ,k,m = ζ̂ℓ · b̂∗ℓ,1,m +

k=1

N
X

(i)

x̂ℓ,k-1 · b̂∗ℓ,k,m

(2)

k=2

• The set of formal variables is R ∪ T , where
n
o
n
o
(i)
(i)
R = α̂(i) , β̂ (i)
∪ ŝℓ,m , t̂ℓ,m
i∈[Q]

i∈[Q], ℓ∈[σ], m∈[N ]

and
n
o
T = α̂(i) , β̂ (i)
i∈[Q]

n
o
′(i)
′(i)
(i)
∪ x̂ℓ,k , ŷℓ,k , ζ̂ℓ

i∈[Q], ℓ∈[σ], k∈[N ]
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n
o
∪ b̂ℓ,k,m , b̂∗ℓ,k,m

ℓ∈[σ], m,k∈[N ]

For completeness we reproduce the simulator behavior on zero-test queries below:
1. It “canonicalizes” the polynomial p by expressing it as a sum of products of formal variables in T
with poly(λ) terms.
2. If τ = 1 and p is the zero polynomial, S outputs “zero”. Otherwise it outputs “non-zero”.
3. If τ = T the simulator decomposes p into the form

Q
X

p=

(i) (j)

α̂ β̂

·

pi,j




(i)
ŝℓ,m ,

(j)
t̂ℓ,m ℓ∈[σ],m∈[N ]




+ fi,j



(i)
ŝℓ,m ,

(j)
t̂ℓ,m ℓ∈[σ],m∈[N ]

!
(3)

i,j=1

where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Q, pi,j is defined as
σ,N
X

pi,j = ci,j ·

!
(i)
ŝℓ,m

(j)
t̂ℓ,m

ℓ,m=1
(i) (j)

where ci,j ∈ Zq is the coefficient of the term ŝ1,1 t̂1,1 , and fi,j consists of the remaining terms.
4. If for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Q, (i, j) = 0 in Cip (corresponding to a zero inner product) and fi,j does not
contain any non-zero term, S outputs “zero”. Otherwise it outputs “non-zero”.
The goal of the proof is to show for the polynomial fi,j we have 2 things we want to be sure of:
1. The terms of fi,j are low degree polynomials of the hidden variables Bℓ and the values α, β, ζ. The
polynomial fi,j is either 0 for all values of x, y encrypted by the adversary or non-zero across all
values of x, y.
2. That the polynomials are low-degree enough that we can use the Schwartz-Zippel to show that the
nonzero polynomial fi,j evaluates to 0 with low probability. The probability space is the hidden
randomness of the scheme, specifically the choice of Bℓ and the values α, β, ζ.
We note that the canonicalization into p as described in Equation 3 is efficient as discussed in [KLM+ 18,
ACD+ 22].
Claim 4. For τ = 1 the simulator’s behavior is correct with overwhelming probability.
Proof of Claim 4. Note that the only monomials that the adversary obtains are in response to key generation and ciphertext queries. The canonical polynomial is of the form
!
!
Q
σ,N
σ,N
X
X
X
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
p=
α̂(i)
cℓ,m · ŝℓ,m + β̂ (i)
cℓ,m ′ · t̂ℓ,m
(4)

=

i=1

ℓ,m=1

Q
X

σ,N
X

α̂

(i)

i=1

=

Q
X
i=1

ℓ,m=1
(i)
cℓ,m

ℓ,m=1

α̂

(i)

σ,N
X
ℓ,m=1

N
X

!
′(i)
ŷℓ,k

· b̂ℓ,k,m

+ β̂

(i)

k=1
(i)
cℓ,m

b̂ℓ,1,m +

σ,N
X

(i)
cℓ,m ′

ℓ,m=1
N
X

· b̂ℓ,k,m

+ β̂

!
′(i)
x̂ℓ,k

·

b̂∗ℓ,k,m

k=1

!!
(i)
ŷℓ,k

N
X

(i)

k=2

σ,N
X
ℓ,m=1

(i)
cℓ,m ′

(i)
ζℓ

·

b̂∗ℓ,1,m

+

N
X

!!
(i)
x̂ℓ,k

·

b̂∗ℓ,k,m

k=2

(5)
where the variables

n
o1≤m≤N
(i)
(i)
cℓ,m , cℓ,m ′
∈ Zq .
1≤ℓ≤σ
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Note that the sums
b̂ℓ,1,m +

N
X

(i)

ŷℓ,k · b̂ℓ,k,m

k=2

can not be the identically zero polynomial over the formal variables {b̂ℓ,k,m }ℓ∈[σ],
(i)

ζℓ · b̂∗ℓ,1,m +

N
X

k,m∈[N ] .

The sums

(i)

x̂ℓ,k · b̂∗ℓ,k,m

k=2
(i)

can only be the identically zero polynomial over the formal variables {b̂∗ℓ,k,m }ℓ∈[σ], k,m∈[N ] if ζℓ = 0
which happens with negligible probability. Both of these facts are true regardless of the actual values of
the adversary’s queries. Recall {α̂(i) }i∈[Q] , {β̂ (i) }i∈[Q] , and {b̂ℓ,k,m }ℓ∈[σ], k,m∈[N ] are sampled uniformly
and independently in the real game. Furthermore, the values {b̂∗ℓ,k,m }ℓ∈[σ], k,m∈[N ] in the real game are
products formed by the inverse computation which are the sum of monomials of degree N . Thus, under
the assumption that the above sums are nonzero, the entire value of p can be expressed as a nonzero polynomial of degree at most N + 1 = poly(λ) in α, β, b̂. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [KLM+ 18, Lemma 2.9],
p evaluates to non-zero with overwhelming probability for random α, β, b̂. This implies that the simulator
is correct with overwhelming probability. This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 5. For τ = T the simulator’s behavior is correct with overwhelming probability.
Proof of Claim 5. From [KLM+ 18, Lemma 3.3] the polynomial fi,j must contain
(i) (j)

Case 1 A “cross-term” of the form c ∗ sli tlj where c ∈ Zq is non-zero and l1 ̸= l2 .
(i) (j)

Case 2 Some partial inner product of the form c ∗ sl,k tl,k where c ∈ Zq and l ∈ [σ], k ∈ [n].
(i)

Case 3 Neither a cross-term or a partial inner product and must be a polynomial of only sl

(j)

or tl .

The above 3 cases have already been proved for an asymmetric pairing group. However, there are additional cases when the pairing group is made symmetric. Therefore, we must show that in the 3 cases, fi,j
cannot be identically zero. We refer to the previous proofs in [KLM+ 18, ACD+ 22] for proofs that if the
polynomials are nonzero they have bounded degree and are unlikely to evaluate to 0.
(i) (j)
Note that in all settings we need to consider the fact that the fi,j can contain terms of the form c ∗ sℓi sℓj
(i) (j)

or c ∗ tℓi tℓj where c ∈ Zq is non-zero. Note in the above that ℓi , ℓj may be the same or different. In all
3 cases the goal is to show that fi,j cannot be identically zero in each of the above cases regardless of the
adversary’s choice of {x(i) , y (j) }.
(i)

(j)

Case 1: In this case there is some cross term c · sli ,mi · tlj ,mj where c ∈ Zq is non-zero and (li , mi ) ̸= (lj , mj ).
(i)

(j)

The value c ∗ sℓi ,mi tℓj ,mj cross-terms were constructed by strictly multiplying elements of Bℓ with B−1
ℓ .
Specifically, one can rewrite the above as
!
!
N
N
X
X
(i)
(j)
(i)
(j)
(j)
(i) (j)
∗
∗
c · sℓi ,mi · tℓj ,mj = cβ α
b̂ℓi ,1,m +
ŷℓi ,k · b̂ℓi ,k,m
ζ̂ℓj · b̂ℓj ,1,mj +
x̂ℓj ,k-1 · b̂ℓj ,k,mj . (6)
k=2

k=2

We now recall the form of b̂∗ terms. For a value k ∈ [N ], let S¬k denote [N ] \ k and let πk,ℓ denote the set
of bijections from S¬k → S¬ℓ , and sgn represent a sign function that maps inputs to {−1, 1}. The variable
P
Q
πk,mi sgn(π, k, mi )
r∈S¬k bℓi ,r,π(r)
∗
b̂ℓi ,k,mi =
.
(7)
det(B)
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Consider the expansion of Equation 6 into monomials of b̂. Each monomial in the expansion contains the
product of exactly two variables in column ℓi of B but no variables in column ℓj . However, we now evaluate whether fi,j can be identically zero should these cross-terms include polynomials multiples elements
from Bℓ together and/or elements of B−1
together. First, we must show that these newly formed crossℓ
terms do not contain terms that would cancel with terms from previously constructed cross-terms. This
can be shown by evaluating the degrees of the polynomials. All of the monomials in numerator of the definition of Equation 6 have degree exactly N , the new polynomials available to the adversary do not. (We
refer the reader to [KLM+ 18] for why different cross terms cannot cancel one another. Here we focus on
(i) (j)
why the newly available terms cannot cancel any cross term.) Specifically, all terms of the form c ∗ sℓi sℓj
(i) (j)

consist of monomials of degree exactly 2. All terms of the form c ∗ tℓi tℓj consist of monomials of total
degree exactly 2(n − 1) (see Equation 7). Therefore, if you have a combination of all these types of cross
terms, the resulting polynomial fi,j could not be identically zero.
(i) (j)

Case 2: In this case there is some partial inner product c ∗ sl,k tl,k where c ∈ Zq and l ∈ [σ], k ∈ [n].
(i) (j)

Kim et al. [KLM+ 18] showed that no form of this term sl,k tl,k consists of monomials of degree exactly
N . As before, these terms will not cancel with the new terms available to the adversary which consist of
monomials of degree exactly 2 and 2(n − 1). Therefore, if you have a combination of partial inner products,
the resulting polynomial fi,j could not be identically zero.
Case 3: Lastly, we consider the case where fi,j consists of nonzero terms that have no products between s
(i)
(j)
and t. Kim et al. [KLM+ 18] showed non-zero terms of the form sl,m or tl,m will not cancel out with each
other in fi,j . However, we now need to consider the case in which we have squared terms. Consider the
canonical polynomial in Claim 4 as described in Equation 4 where there are additionally square terms.
That is,
!
!
Q
σ,N
σ,N
X
X
X
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i) 2
(i)
(i) 2
p=
α̂
cℓ,m,1 · ŝℓ,m + (α̂ )
cℓ,m,3 · ŝℓ,m
(8)
i=1

+ β̂

(i)

ℓ,m=1
σ,N
X

ℓ,m=1

!
(i)
cℓ,m,3

·

(i)
t̂ℓ,m

+ (β̂

ℓ,m=1

(i) 2

)

σ,N
X

!
(i)
cℓ,m,4

·

(i)
t̂ℓ,m

(9)

ℓ,m=1

Recall, that the expansion of t̂ terms are monomials of degree exactly n−1 as described in Equation 7. Thus,
note that terms of the type ŝ have degree exactly 1, terms of the type ŝ2 have degree exactly 2, terms of
the type ŝ have degree exactly n − 1 and terms of the type ŝ2 have degree exactly 2(n − 1). Thus, expanding
Equation 9 in terms of b̂ yields a polynomial that is not identically zero and whose monomials are linearly
independent. So since there is at least one nonzero coefficient the resulting polynomial fi,j could not be
identically zero.
Since we have shown that the polynomial fi,j can not be identically in the 3 new cases, then the simulator
will correctly output ”non-zero” with overwhelming probability. This completes the proof of Claim 5.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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Data

Table 1 compares the timings for the MRProj and MRProjSym proximity search schemes. The MRProj
scheme is asymmetric and uses the MNT159 elliptic curve as described in Kim et al. [KLM+ 18]. The
MRProjSym scheme is symmetric and uses the SS512 elliptic curve. Overall, the search algorithm proved
to be more efficient in the symmetric scheme, improving the overall speed by approximately a factor of
4. Additionally, the efficiency of the Setup and BuildIndex operations improved as well. The only operation that is not more efficient in the symmetric setting is the Trapdoor algorithm. This is likely due to the
way that the SS512 curve and TokGen algorithm are constructed. However, notice that the effect is overall
smaller than the improvement in search time.
10

Time
n
128
192
256
384
512
768
1024

b
3
5
7
10
13
19
25

t
38
57
76
115
153
230
307

Setup
75
47
57
94
153
269
268

MRProj
BuildIndex Trapdoor
1.5
.36
2.2
.8
2.9
1.4
4.4
3.1
5.7
5.7
8.6
13.4
10.8
22.4

Search
234
495
850
1870
3282
7210
12600

Setup
34
38
43
73
106
169
225

MRProjSym
BuildIndex Trapdoor
.7
.8
.9
1.8
1.2
3.2
1.7
7.4
2.3
13
3.4
28
4.3
52

Search
58
130
228
514
907
2030
3580

Table 1: Operations timing (in seconds) of the proximity search algorithm for different vector sizes. n is
the vector length, b the number of bases used, and t = .30 the distance tolerance.
Time

n
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

b
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2

TokGen
µ
σ2
.0012 9.3 × 10−13
0.0018 2.1 × 10−12
0.0026 2.0 × 10−13
0.0030 3.7 × 10−11
0.0036 3.6 × 10−12
0.0044 1.8 × 10−11
0.0051 2.1 × 10−11
0.0056 2.8 × 10−11
0.0063 8.9 × 10−12

MNT159
Encrypt
µ
σ2
0.0038 1.5 × 10−13
0.0054 2.3 × 10−11
0.0075 2.7 × 10−12
0.0179 2.0 × 10−11
0.0210 7.9 × 10−12
0.0252 6.7 × 10−10
0.0282 1.3 × 10−11
0.0330 1.1 × 10−11
0.0369 5.8 × 10−10

Decrypt
µ
σ2
0.0359 3.0 × 10−9
0.0434 1.1 × 10−6
0.0546 9.0 × 10−8
0.1147 1.1 × 10−7
0.1310 5.0 × 10−7
0.1543 1.7 × 10−7
0.1708 8.6 × 10−9
0.1984 8.5 × 10−8
0.2189 3.9 × 10−7

TokGen
µ
σ2
0.0031 9.5 × 10−12
0.0046 7.0 × 10−12
0.0061 1.8 × 10−11
0.0078 4.8 × 10−11
0.0091 1.6 × 10−11
0.0107 8.1 × 10−11
0.0128 3.1 × 10−11
0.0138 1.2 × 10−10
0.0159 2.4 × 10−10

SS512
Encrypt
µ
σ2
0.0016 6.1 × 10−13
0.0025 1.4 × 10−11
0.0032 4.1 × 10−12
0.0076 1.8 × 10−11
0.0089 9.2 × 10−12
0.0104 4.2 × 10−13
0.0123 9.6 × 10−12
0.0135 7.3 × 10−11
0.0156 1.0 × 10−10

µ
0.0080
0.0108
0.0131
0.0303
0.0355
0.0404
0.0471
0.0518
0.0589

Decrypt
σ2
3.3 × 10−11
2.3 × 10−10
1.6 × 10−10
1.9 × 10−10
1.2 × 10−9
2.1 × 10−12
1.9 × 10−10
7.1 × 10−11
6.6 × 10−10

Table 2: Operations timing (in seconds) of the predicate encryption algorithm for different vector sizes. n
is the vector length, and b the number of bases used.
Table 2 compares the timings for the predicate encryption algorithm when it uses the MNT159 or SS512
curves for its pairing group. For each vector length n, each algorithm (TokGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) was run
100 times. The timings for each trial were averaged and the variance calculated. Overall, these results
are consistent with the results we see in 1. Again, we notice that Encrypt and Decrypt run faster in the
symmetric scheme (SS512), but TokGen is marginally slower. While TokGen slows down by a factor of 3,
Encrypt and Decrypt speed up by factors of 3 and 4, respectively.

6

Conclusion

In this paper we discussed the work done by Cachet et al. [ACD+ 22] on proximity searchable encryption.
We reviewed the inner product encryption scheme as described by Kim et al. [KLM+ 18] and analyzed the
efficiency. It was discovered that using a symmetric pairing group greatly improves the efficiency of the
decryption algorithm and thus, we were able to improve the efficiency of search by a factor of 4.
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